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1 Introduction 
 
As of 1 January 2012, the Dutch corporate income tax (‘CIT’) system provides for international juridical double 
tax relief (‘DTR’) under a mechanism referred to in Dutch tax practice as the ‘base exemption for foreign 
business profits’1 (author’s translation).2 The newly introduced DTR mechanism replaces the Dutch-style ‘tax 
exemption with progression method’3 in the area of corporate taxation regarding proceeds derived from foreign-
source business activities. The rationale for this legislative shift, according to the Dutch tax legislator, is to 
arrive at an augmented level of converged tax treatment for corporate taxpayers carrying on business 
operations abroad either directly (i.e., through a permanent establishment; ‘PE’) or indirectly (i.e., through a 
subsidiary).4 One of the introduced tax effects is that current losses suffered by resident corporate taxpayers 
from business activities carried on abroad through a PE are no longer taken into account for CIT calculation 
purposes. The tax legislator implicitly justifies its amendments by labeling the immediate horizontal cross-
border loss set-off possibilities as available under the former DTR mechanism as a “cash flow advantage” 
granted to Dutch resident corporate taxpayers. That characterization reveals an underlying normative 
consideration. We do away with an ‘advantage’ to arrive at a taxing system devoid of anomalies at this point. 
The Dutch tax legislator suggests an improvement. But has he not in fact created a disadvantage? And, by 
doing that infringes upon the spirit of the internal market within the European Union (‘EU’) in the process? 
 
2 The mechanics of the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ 
 
The newly introduced ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ applies to Dutch resident corporate 
taxpayers (a corporate body or a ‘fiscal unity’5) deriving profits from foreign sources.6 The mechanism operates 
as follows. First, the taxpayer’s worldwide earnings are included in the CIT base (‘worldwide profits’). Second, 
the amount of worldwide profits is adjusted to the ‘Dutch taxable base’ (author’s translation). The ‘Dutch taxable 
base’ of a resident corporate taxpayer equals the taxpayer’s worldwide earnings as reduced with an amount 
equal to the ‘positive and negative business income items derived from foreign sources’ (author’s translation).7 
These foreign source income items are determined according to Dutch tax standards while making reference to 
their on balance amounts and calculated on a per country basis.8 A reduction with a positive on balance 
amount of foreign source business income according to Dutch tax standards (i.e., a foreign source business 
profit) entails a lower taxable amount relative to the taxpayer’s worldwide income. A reduction with a negative 
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1 The ‘objectvrijstelling voor buitenlandse ondernemingswinsten’, Articles 15e-j, 23d, 33b-d Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act (‘Dutch 
CITA’). 
2 As proposed in the Dutch Tax Package 2012 (Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2011-2012, 33003, no. 2). The amendments 
have been discussed by various Dutch tax scholars. See H. Pijl, Enkele kanttekeningen bij de objectvrijstelling in het Belastingplan 2012, 
NTFR 2011/2223, T. Bender, Objectvrijstelling voor buitenlandse winst – waarom eigenlijk?, NTFR 2011/2482, H. Pijl, De feestdagen en de 
objectvrijstelling, NTFR 2011/2710, H. Pijl, Non-discriminatie: objectvrijstelling voor buitenlands belastingplichtigen, WFR2012/60 (Pijl 
2012), A.J.A. Stevens, De invoering van een objectvrijstelling voor vaste inrichtingswinsten, in: Maatschappelijk ingesteld, Opstellen 
aangeboden aan dr. D.A. Albregtse ter gelegenheid van zijn afscheid van het FEI van de Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, eigen uitgave 
FEI/EUR, Rotterdam 2011, at 129 et seq., and A.J.A. Stevens, De objectvrijstelling, NTFR Beschouwingen 2012/4. See further, M.G.H. van 
der Kroon, Verslag van het EFS-seminar ‘Vaste inrichting versus deelneming, WFR 2011/1592, T.P.J. van der Pol & M. Evers, Verslag 
YIN-seminar Belastingplan 2011, WFR 2012/28.  
3 The ‘belastingvrijstelling’. 
4 See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2011–2012, 33003, no. 3, at 13, and Kamerstukken II, 2009–2010, 31369, no. 10, at 
27. The ‘base exemption for foreign profits’ is one of the outcomes of the Dutch tax legislator’s quest for a fairer corporate taxation of 
multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’) and small and medium sized enterprises (‘SMEs’). Specifically, the legislator seeks a balanced 
distribution of CIT burden in this respect, Kamerstukken II, 2009-2010, 31369, no. 1. 
5 A ‘fiscal unity’ is a group of tax-consolidated affiliated corporate bodies. Upon request, tax consolidation is enabled under the ‘fiscal unity 
regime’ for corporations having their place of effective management in the Netherlands provided that the parent company holds at least 
95% of the nominal issued and paid-up capital of the subsidiary, Article 15 Dutch CITA.  See further footnote 25. 
6 Article 15e, paragraph 1, Dutch CITA. 
7 Leaving aside vertical loss compensation, Article 20 Dutch CITA. 
8 In the event that a double tax convention (‘DTC’) applies, the resident taxpayer’s ‘foreign source income items’ basically comprise of 
foreign PE profits, proceeds from immovable property situated abroad and (other) income items with respect to which the Netherlands is 
required to grant DTR by means of an exemption. If no DTC applies, a comparable definition is in place. Article 15e, paragraph 2, 
subparagraph a and b Dutch CITA. 
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on balance amount of foreign source business income (i.e., a foreign source business loss) results in a higher 
taxable amount relative to the taxpayer’s worldwide income. 
Contrary to its designated term, the new DTR mechanism does not operate as a true base exemption 
mechanism which one typically finds in international taxation. Under a true base exemption, foreign source 
income items are not taken into consideration when determining the taxable amount.9 These are ignored for tax 
base calculating purposes.10 The Dutch ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ however, does not exempt 
foreign income from the taxable base. It merely operates as an arithmetic tool to adjust the taxpayer’s 
worldwide earnings to the designated Dutch part thereof. In addition, the tax legislator upholds its distinctive 
recognition, for CIT purposes, of the ‘contributory profit’ of the foreign PE to the ‘overall profit’ of the resident 
taxpayer, on the one hand, and the ‘PE’s profit’ for which juridical DTR is granted on the other.11 Without 
entering into a detailed technical description of these phenomena, differences between the contributory profit 
and the PE’s profit arise in case of currency exchange results and internal dealings or internal asset transfers.12 
The introduction of a strict territorial system would have put an end to these distinctions. Since the ‘base 
exemption for foreign business profits’ operates as a fictitious tax base correction mechanism, it would have 
been sounder to designate the legislative instrument accordingly to avoid any misunderstanding. 
However, the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ does share some characteristics with a true 
base exemption mechanism. Like a true base exemption mechanism13, it takes into account the concept of ‘tax 
territoriality’, i.e., the mere recognition of domestic sources of income for tax calculation purposes, to a greater 
extent.14 That is, relative to the DTR mechanism it has replaced. Consequently, it appreciates the concept of 
the ‘ability to pay’ to a much lesser extent than its predecessor, as the tax is levied on an amount deviating from 
the actually derived worldwide business income.15 The new DTR mechanism, for instance, has effectively put 
to an end the (temporary) import of foreign source losses. A taxpayer may no longer offset foreign source 
losses against its domestic source profits within the same tax year for Dutch CIT calculation purposes. In this 
respect the effects are similar to those under a true base exemption mechanism, which does not allow for any 
cross-border loss set-off either. This may explain the corresponding parlance. 
 
3 Legislature: “Enhanced equal corporate tax treatment for resident taxpayers’ foreign business 
operations regardless of the legal form chosen” 
 
By introducing the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ the Dutch tax legislator seeks to achieve an 
enhanced equal CIT treatment for Dutch resident taxpayers operating their businesses in a foreign tax 
jurisdiction, regardless of how these foreign business operations have been legally organized.16 Hence, equal 
CIT effects irrespective of whether the resident corporate taxpayer conducts its business abroad either directly 
(i.e., through a PE) or indirectly (i.e., through a controlled subsidiary, which for CIT purposes is referred to as a 
‘participation’). The Dutch tax legislator seeks to promote the neutrality of legal form in the field of CIT to the 
extent that it concerns the export of the production factor of enterprise. In our view, this, as part of the general 
concept of ‘tax neutrality’, is a fair tax policy consideration. The legal forms in which (foreign) business 
operations are structured do not affect the actual amount of economic benefits. Therefore, the legal form should 
not, or to the least extent, affect the volume of tax payable.17 
Until 1 January 2012, the neutrality of legal form had been promoted to a lesser extent than is the case 
today. This, due to the differences in the juridical DTR and economic DTR mechanisms that applied up to that 
                                                 
9 See for instance the exemption mechanism as laid down in Article 23A OECD Model Tax Convention.  
10 Foreign source income items may, nevertheless, be recognized for the mere purpose of determining progressivity in the applicable tax 
rates against which the domestic income is subsequently taxed. Such a base exemption mechanism is typically referred to as a ‘tax 
exemption with progression’. 
11 Respectively, the ‘bijdragewinst’, the ‘generale winst’ and the ‘vaste inrichtingswinst’. These concepts were already recognized under the 
former Dutch DTR mechanism. 
12 Numerical examples can be found in C. Wisman, Artikelsgewijs NDFR-commentaar op de objectvrijstelling voor buitenlandse 
ondernemingswinsten, art. 15e e.v. Wet Vpb, Sdu fiscale en financiële uitgevers. This online ‘Annotated Article-by-Article Database’ entitled 
‘Fiscale Encyclopedie NDFR (Nederlandse Documentatie Fiscaal Recht) is available to subscribers at: www.ndfr.nl. For details and 
numerical examples regarding the effects of the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption with progression method’, see Maarten F. de Wilde, Currency 
Exchange Results - What If Member States Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation Whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a 
Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 9 and Maarten F. de Wilde, Intra-Firm 
Transactions – What if Member States Subjected Taxpayers to Unlimited Income Taxation whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a 
Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 (Volume 65), No. 12. Any differences between the contributory 
profit and the PE’s profit because of currency exchange results and internal dealings or internal asset transfers are not further discussed. 
13 Or the limited taxation of non-resident taxpayers. 
14 See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2009–2010, 31369, no. 9. 
15 Cf. Bender, supra note 2. 
16 See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2011–2012, 33003, no. 3, at 13 and Kamerstukken II, 2009–2010, 31369, no. 10, at 
27.  
17 See Klaus Vogel, ‘Worldwide v. Source Taxation of Income – A Review and Re-evaluation of Arguments (Part II)’, Intertax 1988/10, at 
319. 
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date. In particular, while losses incurred by a foreign PE were available for immediate offset against domestic 
profits of the resident corporate taxpayer, current losses derived from business activities carried on through a 
foreign subsidiary were not taken into account for Dutch CIT calculations.  
The Netherlands provided juridical DTR for foreign source active income under the ‘tax exemption with 
progression method’.18 Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, this DTR mechanism is conceptually not a 
base exemption method either. 19 The Dutch-style ‘tax exemption’ operates as a credit mechanism.  First, the 
taxpayer’s worldwide earnings are included in the CIT base (‘worldwide profits’). This holds true also in the 
event that a DTC applies. In such cases, the Netherlands reserves the right, when taxing Dutch resident 
taxpayers, to include foreign-source income (positive and negative) in the tax base.20 Second, DTR is granted 
with regard to the foreign-source income that is included in the domestic tax base under Dutch tax law.21 
Subsequently, the Dutch tax payable is determined by crediting the Dutch tax attributable to the foreign-source 
income against the Dutch tax calculated by reference to the taxpayer’s worldwide income.22 One of the tax 
effects of applying this DTR mechanism is that any current foreign source business losses suffered are taken 
into account for CIT base calculations (that is, in the same taxable period as in which these losses have 
actually been incurred, notably, analytically leaving aside any potential differences between profit calculations 
for CIT purposes on the one hand and commercial accounting purposes on the other). The import of tax losses, 
however, is intended to be temporary. If the resident taxpayer manages to derive profits from its foreign 
business ventures in subsequent years, no DTR is granted as long as the losses taken into account earlier 
have not been recaptured (‘mechanism for recapture of foreign losses’).23  
To the extent that resident taxpayers carry on their business operations abroad indirectly, the 
Netherlands provides for economic DTR by means of a base exemption mechanism under the participation 
exemption regime.24 As a rule, the Dutch CIT system taxes corporate entities on a stand-alone basis, 
regardless as to whether they are part of an integrated group (the separate entity approach).25 Consequently, 
taxable earnings include shareholding proceeds (e.g., dividends, capital gains/losses). Under the application of 
the participation exemption regime however, proceeds from an actively held participation are fully exempt from 
the CIT base. Eligible to qualify as ‘participation’ are equity investments of at least 5 per cent in the nominal 
paid-up capital of the underlying company. The participation exemption applies to both positive proceeds (e.g. 
dividends, capital gains) and negative proceeds (capital losses, impairments) from a participation.  
                                                 
18 See M.F. de Wilde & G.T.W. Janssen, The Netherlands – Key practical issues to eliminate double taxation of business income, in 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 96b, sec. 2. (Sdu Uitgevers 2011), Online Books IBFD. Today, the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption with 
progression method’ generally applies to resident taxpayers, individual natural persons, having active income from foreign sources. 
19 The Dutch DTR mechanism for active income from foreign sources which had been applied in the Netherlands until 1 January 2012 is 
referred to in the international tax literature as the “exemption-with-progression” method. See B.J. Arnold & M.J. McIntyre, International Tax 
Primer, 2nd ed. at 33-34 (Kluwer Law International 2002). It is also referred to in international tax literature as a “base exemption 
mechanism”, pursuant to which “the foreign source income is initially included in the taxpayer’s income for the limited purpose of 
determining the average tax rate that would apply to that income if the foreign income were taxable”. In addition, it is generally stated that 
the “average rate is then used to compute the actual tax due on the taxpayer’s domestic source income”. This is, unfortunately, an 
erroneous description of this Dutch juridical double tax relief mechanism. Furthermore, the ECJ (for example, in X Holding v. 
Staatssecretaris van Financiën (Case C-337/08)) appears not to appreciate fully the operation of the mechanism. Indeed, it does not 
function in such a way that it exempts foreign source income from the tax base. Conceptually, despite the reference to the phrase “tax 
exemption”, which mirrors the ambiguous Dutch term “belastingvrijstelling” which literally means “tax exemption” – presumably thereby 
giving rise to the confusion – , the double tax relief mechanism operates as a credit.  
20 The ‘tax base reservation’ or, in Dutch, ‘grondslagvoorbehoud’. 
21 The ‘tax base requirement’ or, in Dutch, ‘grondslageis’. 
22 DTR is calculated without taking the foreign tax burden into account. Conceptually, a credit is provided for domestic tax attributable to the 
foreign income. In its application, the methodology operates in a way that is akin to the second limitation commonly applied with regard to 
international taxation under an ordinary credit mechanism. However, the second limitation applies on a stand-alone basis, i.e. without 
referring to the foreign taxes levied, as is typically the case under the first limitation under the ordinary credit mechanisms. 
23 For details and numerical examples, see Maarten F. de Wilde, What if Member States Subjected Non-Resident Taxpayers to Unlimited 
Income Taxation whilst Granting Double Tax Relief under a Netherlands-Style Tax Exemption?, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2011 
(Volume 65), No. 6. Transitional provisions apply to resident taxpayers who have derived foreign source or domestic source business 
losses in the taxable periods before January 2012 with respect to which the ‘mechanism for recapture of foreign losses’ (Articles. 31-33 
Unilateral Decree for the Avoidance of Double Taxation 2001, ‘UDADT 2001’) and the ‘mechanism for carry forward of foreign profits’ 
(Articles 34 and 35 UDADT 2001) apply, Article 33b Dutch CITA and Article 35 UDADT 2001 (i.e., the latter as amended per 1 January 
2012). 
24 Article 13 Dutch CITA. 
25 For group companies, an exception to this economically inefficient CIT treatment is made under the so-called ‘fiscal unity regime’, Article 
15 Dutch CITA. Notably, the tax consolidation regime does not apply in cross-border scenarios (see further footnote 42). Another effect of 
adopting such a territorial approach regarding indirect foreign business operations under the participation exemption regime is that currency 
exchange results are exempt from the CIT base as well. This holds true as regards to currency exchange results realized on the underlying 
business operations as well as the equity investment in the foreign subsidiary. On the basis of the consistent case law of the Dutch 
Supreme Court, a currency exchange result on an equity investment eligible for economic DTR is considered to be a proceed from a 
participation (Dutch Supreme Court, 9 June 1982, BNB 1982/230). Such results are exempt from the CIT base if the participation is eligible 
for economic DTR under the participation exemption regime. An exception to this rule can be found in Article 28b Dutch CITA (see further 
footnote 30). Moreover, intra-group transfers of property, for instance a capital asset transfer between the Dutch parent company and the 
foreign subsidiary, entail the imposition of CIT on the hidden reserve, which immediately becomes due. 
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The Dutch CIT system maintains this approach unambiguously to the extent that resident corporate 
taxpayers carry on business operations abroad via a controlled subsidiary. Accordingly, the proceeds derived 
from foreign business activities carried on through controlled subsidiaries are kept completely outside Dutch 
taxation. Hence, a strict territorial approach towards taxing corporate business income. As a consequence, 
current losses suffered abroad do not affect the taxable base in the Netherlands.26 These losses are also not 
taken into account indirectly, that is, as a capital or impairment loss on the equity investment. This holds true 
due to the application of the participation exemption regime.27 There is one exception to the non-allowance of 
loss import: the ‘liquidation losses set-off regime’.28 Under certain conditions, final losses realized at the level of 
the corporate shareholder upon the liquidation of the (foreign) company in which the participation is held may 
be deducted, provided that, basically, the underlying business operations are actually discontinued by the 
group as well.  
Hence, until 1 January 2012, the non-neutral CIT treatment entailed that resident corporate taxpayers 
to a certain extent were free to decide on the manner in which the Dutch CIT system dealt with foreign source 
business losses. Business operations directly carried on abroad enabled current losses to be taken into 
account (i.e., horizontal loss set-off), while the carrying on of such operations indirectly did (and does) not. In 
the latter case, a loss set-off is only allowed upon liquidation (i.e., vertical loss set-off).29 Obviously, such an 
arbitrary tax treatment distorts decisions on the legal structuring of business activities. 
To cut back this arbitrage to the extent that it concerns foreign source business losses suffered by 
resident corporate taxpayers, the Dutch tax legislator has brought the CIT effects into line regardless of their 
(legal) organization. Analogous to the treatment of losses of foreign subsidiaries, the import of losses or cross-
border loss relief regarding  foreign PEs is postponed to a future date. The converged CIT treatment of PEs 
and foreign participations in this respect is complete30, since so-called ‘final foreign PE losses’ may be set-off 
against Dutch-source profits under the so-called ‘cessation regime’ (author’s translation). Final foreign PE 
                                                 
26 Another effect of adopting such a territorial approach regarding indirect foreign business operations under the participation exemption 
regime is that currency exchange results are exempt from the CIT base as well. This holds true as regards to currency exchange results 
realized on the underlying business operations as well as the equity investment in the foreign subsidiary. On the basis of the consistent 
case law of the Dutch Supreme Court, a currency exchange result on an equity investment eligible for economic DTR is considered to be a 
proceed from a participation (Dutch Supreme Court, 9 June 1982, BNB 1982/230). Such results are exempt from the CIT base if the 
participation is eligible for economic DTR under the participation exemption regime. An exception to this rule can be found in Article 28b 
Dutch CITA (see further footnote 30). Moreover, intra-group transfers of property, for instance a capital asset transfer between the Dutch 
parent company and the foreign subsidiary, entail the imposition of CIT on the hidden reserve, which immediately becomes due. 
27 Capital and impairment losses on the equity investment are, as a rule, included in the taxable base. Consequently, such a loss may be 
deducted. If the equity interest is however considered to be a participation, which is eligible for economic double tax relief under the 
participation exemption regime, a deduction of such losses is rendered impossible as all proceeds from a participation – both positive and 
negative, including impairments – are excluded from the taxable base. 
28 The ‘liquidation loss set-off regime’, or in Dutch ‘liquidatieverliesregeling’, is laid down in Article 13d Dutch CITA. The deductible 
‘liquidation loss’ is generally calculated as the difference between the participation’s acquisition price and the sum of the liquidation 
proceeds. 
29  Up until 1 January 2012, the tax legislator sought to tackle undesired implications in this respect with a specific ‘claw-back mechanism’ 
laid down in Article 13c Dutch CITA. Today, transitional rules apply in this respect as well (Article 33b Dutch CITA). This is not further 
discussed. 
30 Divergent tax treatment nevertheless remains where it concerns the CIT effects of currency exchange results realized and intra-firm 
property transfers. Remaining mutual differences under the ‘functional separate entity approach’ towards PEs and the ‘separate entity 
approach’ towards subsidiaries are not further discussed. Currency exchange results are still recognized for CIT and juridical DTR 
calculation purposes under the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ (as was the case under the ‘tax exemption with progression 
method’). On the contrary, under the current economic DTR mechanism for active income, the participation exemption, currency exchange 
results remain exempt from the CIT base. Realized hidden reserves upon intra-firm asset transfers from the Dutch head office to the PE 
abroad remain to be taxed in tranches (as was the case under the ‘tax exemption with progression method’ as well). On the contrary, under 
the economic DTR mechanism, economic equivalent intra-group property transfers between a parent and a subsidiary still trigger 
immediate CIT liabilities on the realized hidden reserves (‘exit tax’). Interestingly, the Dutch tax legislator refers to these maintained 
differences in CIT treatment dependant on the chosen legal form as a necessary consequence of the legal differences between the 
carrying on of a business through a PE or a participation. See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2011–2012, 33003, no. 10, at 
26 In our view, this is remarkable, to say the least, as the legal differences were the key argument for the converging CIT treatment 
regarding foreign source business losses. We have some difficulties understanding the logics behind arguing the policy objective of 
promoting the neutrality of legal form to adopt converging tax treatment in one area (cross-border loss set-off), while, utilizing the mutual 
legal differences as an argument to uphold diverging CIT treatment in another (currency exchange results and intra-firm dealings and asset 
transfers). The legislature has also amended the Dutch CITA with regard to the CIT treatment currency exchange results realized on equity 
investment that qualify as a participation for economic DTR purposes. Recently, Article 28b Dutch CITA has been introduced. The 
amendments enable resident taxpayers to opt for conditionally taking into account, for CIT base calculation purposes, currency exchange 
losses on their participations. Taxpayers may deduct currency exchange losses provided that they successfully litigate their claim through 
the Dutch court system (including a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the freedoms in this respect). Resident 
taxpayers awarded with the currency loss deduction are subsequently confronted with the CIT recognition of currency exchange profits on 
all their participations. At the time of finishing this manuscript, as far as we know, no taxpayer has brought the matter before the tax courts. 
In Dutch tax literature this tax treatment has been questioned as to its compatibility with primary European Union law. See M.F. de Wilde 
and C. Wisman, Tussenregeling valutaresultaten; Gooit Gielen roet in het eten?, NTFR 2011-1646. 
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losses are defined as losses realized upon the winding up of the foreign business operations. The ‘cessation 
regime’ operates in a manner equivalent to the ‘liquidation loss set-off regime’ for participations.31  
The legislator has achieved a more similar CIT treatment for Dutch resident taxpayers with business 
activities abroad by extending the application of the territoriality principle. 
 
4 Legislature: “Enhanced equal corporate tax treatment via base exemption by removing timing benefits” 
 
Conceptually, several alternatives were available to achieve enhanced equal CIT treatment for Dutch resident 
taxpayers operating their businesses in a foreign tax jurisdiction. The tax legislator, for instance, could have 
decided to replace the participation exemption regime for an economic DTR mechanism that operates in a way 
which is akin to the ‘tax exemption with progression method’, i.e., some kind of ‘indirect tax exemption’ for 
grossed-up proceeds from a participation. This has not happened. The ‘tax exemption’ for juridical DTR 
purposes has been replaced by the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’. Should we consider the tax 
legislator’s choice for the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ a just one? 
A choice out of a variety of available alternatives suggests an underlying motive. During the legislative 
process, the Dutch tax legislator based its choice for the legislative amendment with the statement that, by 
doing this, a ‘benefit’ is removed: “A base exemption for PE profits takes away the timing benefit of allowing a 
current cross-border loss set-off under a subsequent recapture mechanism, which, today, is exclusively 
available to resident taxpayers carrying on their foreign business operations through a PE. That is, relative to 
the cross-border loss set-off possibilities for resident taxpayers carrying on their foreign business activities 
through a subsidiary, which is only available upon the liquidation of the subsidiary and the discontinuation of the 
underlying business activities” (author’s translation).32 These wordings reveals a normative consideration. We 
do away with a ‘benefit’ to arrive at a taxation approach which is, at this point, devoid of anomalies. Indeed, the 
tax legislator suggests an improvement: “This measure entails a balanced CIT treatment of PEs and 
participations” (author’s translation).33 The removal of the ‘benefit’ has the consequence of arriving at a 
‘balanced’ CIT system.34 To reassure us, the State Secretary for Finance pointed out that such a DTR 
mechanism “does not encroach upon the spirit of the internal market” (author’s translation).  
 
5 Or less equal tax treatment via base exemption by creating (timing) disadvantages? 
 
5.1 Legislature creates an imbalance 
 
One could also refer to the legislator’s choice from an opposite point of reference. From that perspective, the 
CIT treatment regarding the carrying on of foreign business operations through a subsidiary relative to a PE 
would entail the recognition of a (timing) disadvantage. The legislative amendment then has the effect of 
exacerbating the disadvantage. In that case, the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ does not put an 
end to an ‘advantage’ at all. On the contrary, it creates a disadvantage. By creating that disadvantage, the 
Dutch tax legislator arrives at an increased imbalanced CIT system which encroaches upon the spirit of the 
internal market.  
What makes a balanced tax system? What are the parameters we should employ? In our view, a 
balanced tax system is a system that treats economically similar scenarios alike. That is, equal tax treatment in 
economically equal situations. With the appreciation of the fact that the sovereignty in direct taxation matters 
retains at the level of the EU Member States (‘EU MSs’), this entails, first, that the direct tax system of a state 
should not distinguish in determining the tax burden on the basis of the taxpayer’s nationality or its tax place of 
residence (the ‘equality principle’). Second, it entails that the direct tax system of a state does not distinguish in 
determining the tax burden as imposed based on the geographical location where the taxpayer employs its 
production factors of capital, labour and enterprise. Taxation should not affect (or to the least extent possible) 
the attribution of production factors (the ‘neutrality principle’). These normative cornerstones of a fair tax system 
                                                 
31 Article 15i Dutch CITA. In our assessments thus far, the tax legislator has made it impossible to undo the deferral of cross-border loss 
set-off. See Article 15i and 15j Dutch CITA. It is worth noting that the ‘cessation regime’ applies on a per country basis.  
32 See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2011–2012, 33003, no. 3, at 13, Tweede Kamer, 2009–2010, 31369, no. 9, at 5, and 
Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2010-2011, 32 740, no. 1, at 28. 
33 See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken II, 2011–2012, 33003, no. 3, at 13. 
34 The tax legislator forecasts an ‘improvement’, referred to as the “temporization effect” relative to the former DTR methodology, to 
produce annual tax revenues worth € 250 million. See Dutch Parliamentary Papers, Kamerstukken I, 2011-2012, no. 33003, no. F, at 1-2, 
and Kamerstukken II, 2011–2012, 33003, no. 3, at 44. The substantiation of these figures has been kept concise. The Dutch legislator 
argues that an amount of foreign source losses of presumably € 3 billion are subject to an average loss set-off deferral period of seemingly 
11 years. Considering the time value of money, the revenue’s yearly cash flow advantage is estimated at € 250 million. Accordingly, the 
budgetary impact of the introduction of the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ solely is the consequence of the loss set-off 
deferral. 
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(amongst others) were already rudimentarily as the ‘maxims of equity’ by Adam Smith in the 18th century.35 
Equivalent normative points of departure constitute the cornerstone objectives of the European Union, which, 
for the purposes of achieving the optimization of the collective well-being of the people within the EU, strives for 
an equal and non-distortive treatment of those persons moving themselves or their production factors within the 
European Union territories, an envisaged area without internal frontiers referred to as the internal market.36 The 
spirit of the internal market stipulates equality and neutrality, also in the field of direct taxation. From this 
perspective, an imbalanced CIT system is a system that treats economic equivalent circumstances differently. It 
distorts the attribution of production factors, for instance, within the envisaged internal market without internal 
frontiers.  
The question as to whether the newly introduced ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ DTR 
mechanism in the Dutch CIT system should be considered an improvement or a decline can be relatively easily 
answered if the aforementioned normative basis is taken into the equation. The test becomes a business 
economics one. If the application of the ‘base exemption’, from an economic perspective, entails a lesser equal 
and accordingly greater distortive CIT treatment, the DTR mechanism should be considered as a decline. If, 
from an economic perspective, the application of the ‘base exemption’ entails a more equal and accordingly 
lesser distortive CIT treatment, the DTR mechanism should be considered an improvement. A more balanced 
and less arbitrarily functioning taxing system.  
From a business economics perspective, the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ incontestably 
produces disadvantages. Essentially, the application of the DTR mechanism limits the offset of actual business 
losses suffered from (intra-EU) cross-border business activities against the profits of the taxpayer. 
Consequently, the taxpayer involved faces a higher overall tax cost in the taxable period. Effectively that is, as 
some of its costs – those having a foreign source – are not taken into account for CIT base calculation 
purposes. The actual commercial profits and the profits for CIT calculation purposes become out of step to a 
significantly greater extent. Resident taxpayers suffering real business losses from their business ventures 
abroad are forced to finance their tax loss set-off entitlements upfront. The business economics disadvantages, 
at best, constitute a cash flow disadvantage.37 To the extent that resident taxpayers are unable to compensate 
their current foreign losses with future profits, they lose their conditional tax loss set-off entitlements. In 
addition, these disadvantages produced by the Dutch CIT system merely affect resident corporate taxpayers 
who directly or indirectly conduct business operations abroad. Viz., the (cash flow) disadvantages are not 
forced up to resident taxpayers conducting their business affairs solely within the Netherlands, the domestic 
environment. Taxpayers who are only commercially active within Dutch territory are not required to finance their 
tax loss set-off entitlements upfront.38 This creates a bias towards investment in the taxing jurisdiction in which 
the taxpayer already derives taxable profits, which in this case would be the Netherlands.39 Tax reality differs 
from the actual business economics reality in economically equivalent scenarios. Accordingly, the introduced 
‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ to a greater extent produces an imbalanced CIT system. A 
decline. By rendering the export of production factors commercially less attractive, the Dutch tax legislator 
restricts the envisaged functioning of the internal market without internal frontiers. Notably, the comparison of 
the cross-border investment with the domestic investment has been under-exposed in Dutch parliamentary 
history. The desired tax convergence merely focuses on resident taxpayers operating their businesses abroad 
in a direct or indirect manner. Tax convergence with resident taxpayers doing business at home in an indirect 
or direct manner apparently seems less relevant in the eyes of the Dutch tax legislator. 
The limited deduction of intra-EU cross-border losses creates market distortion that the European 
Commission considered, more than a decade ago, “from a business perspective, to constitute one of the most 
                                                 
35 See A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Volume I-III, 8th edition, London, 1796, Volume III, Book 
V, Chapter II, Part II, at 255-259. 
36 See the preamble to the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’). See also Article 2 TEU in conjunction with Articles 26 and 119 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. See for a comparison Court of Justice, case 15/81 (Gaston Schul) and Frans Vanistendael, No 
European Taxation Without European Representation, 9 EC Tax Review 142 (2000), at 142. 
37 Our analysis basically matches the one carried out by the Court of Justice in the case Rewe Zentralfinanz (Court of Justice, 29 March 
2007, case C-347/04). In Rewe Zentralfinanz, the Court of Justice refers to an imposed cash flow disadvantage to rule a German CIT write-
off limitation on foreign equity investments incompatible with the freedom of establishment. The timing of the write-off differentiated 
depending on the tax place of residence of the respective legal entity in which the German corporate body holds it equity investment. To 
the extent that it concerned an equity investment in a company having its tax place of residence in Germany, the German CIT legislation 
allowed for an immediate write-off for CIT base calculation purposes in line with business economics reality. If it concerned an equity 
investment in a company having its tax place of residence within another MS, the German CIT legislation merely allowed for a write-off for 
CIT base calculation purposes to the extent the equity investment produced positive earnings. As, typically, costs precede profits, equity 
investments in German companies are treated favorably for tax purposes (tax write-off today) in comparison with equity investment in non-
German EU companies (tax write-off perhaps tomorrow).  
38 This holds true to the extent that taxpayers did not on-balance suffer a tax loss. On-balance tax losses are typically carried forward to 
subsequent tax years (vertical loss set-off). Contrary to, for instance, VAT no tax refunds occur in the area of direct taxation. 
39 Cf. Michael P. Devereux, Debating Proposed Reforms of the Taxation of Corporate Income in the European Union, 11 International Tax 
and Public Finance 71 (2004), at 75. 
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important obstacles to cross-border economic activity”.40 It is no coincidence that the possibility to horizontally 
offset cross-border losses continually is referred to as one of the spearhead welfare optimizing features of the 
European Commission’s CCCTB proposal.41 From this perspective, the enhanced territorial taxation approach 
as adopted by the Netherlands per 1 January 2012 should be considered as a retrograde step. A disincentive 
for cross-border trade. 
 
5.2 The imbalance further outlined  
 
Two scenarios  
The created imbalance under the Dutch CIT system can be illustrated by means of some stylized numerical 
examples. For this purpose, we compare the economically equivalent scenarios of "Domestic X Group”, i.e., 
our ‘Benchmark Case’ and “Cross-Border Y Group”, i.e., our ‘Tested Case’. We consider both groups to share 
the following characteristics. Both operate a functionally integrated business enterprise within the internal 
market during a two-year period. From an economic perspective, accordingly, both X Group and Y Group 
constitute a single  economic entity operating its  unitary business enterprise for profit.42 X Group is exclusively 
active within a domestic or non-cross-border economic environment. It operates solely within Netherlands’ 
territories. Y Group conducts its integrated business operations in an intra-EU cross-border economic 
environment. It operates both in the Netherlands and Belgium. The  business profits produced by X Group and 
Y Group are identical. 
Before we proceed calculating, the following remark should be made. It is emphasized that the fact that 
one case (“Domestic X Group”) deals with the attribution of production factors in a domestic environment, while 
                                                 
40 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee: Towards 
an Internal Market without tax obstacles - A strategy for providing companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide 
activities, Brussels, 23.10.2001, COM(2001) 582 final, at 39. 
41 See the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), COM(2011)121/4.  
42 This unitary character holds irrespective of whether the business operations are legally concentrated  within a single legal entity or legally 
segregated within a number of legal entities. Indeed, we essentially consider that form is not to be elevated over substance in corporate 
taxation. Consequently, analytically, no CIT difference should result to the extent companies conduct their business operations ‘directly’, 
i.e., through branches or ‘indirectly’, i.e., through the incorporation of  controlled subsidiaries. Hence, we appreciate the rationale of the firm 
as being one economic entity to build our analysis of the Dutch CIT system. This approach may be recognized to echo the established 
‘theory of the firm’ developed by Coase, and the ‘unitary method’ it essentially promotes in the area of international corporate taxation. This 
is not further discussed. For some discussion see R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) at 386-404. See also 
Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s Length, 30 Tax Notes 625 (1988) at 666-667, Jinyan Li, Global Profit Split: 
An Evolutionary Approach to International Income Allocation, 50 Can. Tax J. 823 (2002) at 832-833, Kerrie Sadiq, The traditional Rationale 
of the Arm’s length Approach to Transfer Pricing – Should the Separate Accounting Model Be Maintained for Modern Multinational 
Entities?, 7 Journal of Australian Taxation 196 (2004) at 237-238, and  Richard D. Pomp, Issues in the Design of Formulary Apportionment 
in the Context of NAFTA, 49 Tax L. Rev. 795 (1993), at 806-811. We are very much aware that we diverge from the separate accounting 
model as typically adopted in the international tax regime. Under separate accounting  each legal entity constitutes a separate corporate 
taxpayer. We analytically depart from that approach as its recognition implicitly and essentially entails the non-appreciation of the desired 
neutrality of the legal form. As diverging intra-group legal realities are economically insignificant, we have chosen to not build our analysis 
on the separate entity approach. Viz., it is the separate accounting model which causes the problems we are seeking to identify and resolve 
in this paper. 
Conveniently, the Dutch CIT system has been traditionally acquainted with a tax regime that recognizes the unitary business 
approach, i.e., the ‘fiscal unity regime’ (Article 15 Dutch CITA, see also footnote 25). The regime provides for a full tax consolidation of 
affiliated group companies. Notably, we do not scrutinize the group definition requirements that need to be met. We simply assume that the 
group definition under Article 15 corresponds with the economic entity, and that the tax consolidation applies mandatory (i.e., to avoid 
arbitrage possibilities leaking in). Under the application of the tax consolidation regime, substantially all intra-group legal realities are 
eliminated for Dutch CIT purposes. Accordingly, as we seek to identify and subsequently cancel out the tax induced distortions of the forms 
of legal organization imposed by the Netherlands CIT system, we consider it useful to benchmark our analysis from the perspective of 
analytically disregarding the differences in the manner in which corporate families are organized legally. This enables us to put on a parity 
the business operations undertaken by X Group and Y Group regardless of the legal forms chosen, thereby adopting an approach which 
promotes the neutrality of the legal form.  
Consequently, the presence of this regime in the Dutch corporate tax system neatly bridges the gap between theory, i.e., the 
unitary approach, to Dutch tax practice, i.e., the ‘fiscal unity regime’, thereby bypassing separate accounting. This enables us to analytically 
take together economically equivalent scenarios under different legal organizations, referred to in the paragraphs hereunder as the 
alternative ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ cases. Finally, please note that we are very much aware of the limited application of the Dutch fiscal unity 
regime in a cross-border environment. The regime applies merely to the extent the group companies involved operate their unitary 
business within Netherlands’ territories. The regime does not allow for cross-border tax consolidation, thereby reintroducing separate 
accounting in the cross-border environment, consequently unilaterally restricting outbound direct investment. This restrictive Dutch CIT 
treatment, nevertheless, has been sanctioned by the Court of Justice in X Holding, supra note 19. This matter is not further discussed here 
as our primary focus, today, is on the Dutch ‘base exemption regime’. For an analysis of X Holding and (non-)cross-border tax grouping, 
see Maarten F. de Wilde, On X Holding and the ECJ’s ambiguous approach towards the proportionality test, 19 EC Tax Review 170 (2010), 
at 170-182. For an analytical comparison, worth noting is the approach found in the European Commission’s Proposal for a Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB),COM(2011)121/4. The cross-border tax grouping is considered one 
the most significant welfare optimizing elements of the CCCTB. As the European Commission forwards: ‘Allowing the immediate 
consolidation of profits and losses for computing the EU-wide taxable bases is a step towards reducing over-taxation in cross-border 
situations and thereby towards improving the tax neutrality conditions between domestic and cross-border activities to better exploit the 
potential of the Internal Market’, see Explanatory Memorandum of the proposed CCCTB Directive, p. 5.  
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the other case (“Cross-Border Y Group”) deals with the attribution of production factors in an intra-EU cross-
border environment is of no analytical significance. This holds true from both a business economics perspective 
as well as from the perspective of the internal market without internal frontiers. Simply put, we address two 
entrepreneurs, X Group and Y Group who operate their functionally integrated business as single economic 
entities within an integrated single European market. Consequently from that perspective, also for Dutch CIT 
purposes, there should be no difference in the treatment of these equivalent cases. The unilaterally imposed 
effective Dutch CIT burdens should be identical.43 Notably, we limit our analysis to the case of an intra-EU 
outbound direct investment from the Netherlands to abroad. Hence, we address the Dutch CIT effects 
regarding the export of the production factor of enterprise by a Dutch entrepreneur, the ‘outbound scenario’ 
from the ‘home state’ perspective. The effects on production factor imports, the ‘inbound scenario’ from the 
‘host state’ perspective, are not addressed. 
  
Scenario 1: ‘X Group’ – Domestic scenario – ‘Benchmark Case’44 
A Dutch resident taxpayer, X Group B.V., operates two businesses, two branches of activities. One branch is 
situated in Utrecht, the Netherlands, the other is situated in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
• In the first alternative, ‘Case Direct’, X Group B.V. conducts its functionally integrated business 
operations directly; 
• In the second alternative, ‘Case Indirect’, X Group B.V. operates its Utrecht and Rotterdam branches 
via controlled subsidiaries, Utrecht B.V. and Rotterdam B.V. Upon the request of the entities involved, 
Utrecht B.V. and Rotterdam B.V. have been tax consolidated under the application of the Dutch ‘fiscal 
unity regime’.45 In effect, X Group B.V. is considered the substantive corporate taxpayer conducting the 
two branches of business activities directly for CIT calculation purposes. Focusing on business 
economics realities, economically insignificant intra-group legal realities are disregarded for CIT 
calculation purposes (‘full tax consolidation’). Conceptually, the Dutch tax consolidation regime aligns 
with the unitary taxation concept as it eliminates, for CIT calculation purposes, economically 
insignificant intra-group legal realities. The Dutch tax consolidation concept accordingly elevates 
substance over form. 
• The produced business profits are identical in both alternative cases; 
• The CIT rate is assumed to equal a linear 25%.46 
 
In year 1, the commercial profits produced by the Utrecht branch equals € 100. The Rotterdam branch 
produced a profit of <€ 80> (i.e., a loss). In year 2, the Utrecht branch’s profit equals € 50. In that year, the 
Rotterdam branch produces a profit of € 100. Accordingly, the overall business profits realized in year 1 and 
year 2 equal € 170. The CIT effects are as follows. 
 
Fig. 1. ‘Case Direct’ (nominal amounts) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Cumulative Yrs. 1-2 
Comm. profit Utrecht 100 50 150 
Comm. profit R’dam <80> 100 20 
Comm. profit Group X bv 20 150 170 
Taxable profit 20 150 170 
CIT payable (25%) 5 37.50 42.50 
Attribution CIT Utrecht 25 12.50 37.50 
Attribution CIT R’dam <20> 25 5 
 
Fig. 2 ‘Case Indirect’ (nominal amounts) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Cumulative Yrs. 1-2 
Comm. profit Utrecht bv 100 50 150 
Comm. profit R’dam bv <80> 100 20 
                                                 
43 Please note that we do not take into account the distortive effects caused by mutual tax differentials, i.e., market distortions that arise as 
a result of the disparities in the CIT systems of the EU MSs. This constitutes an analytically separate matter. 
44 Please note, that we build our analysis on this base case. In the purely domestic scenario, no distortions in the organizational form arise. 
There is a tax parity regardless of the legal forms chosen due to the application of the fiscal unity regime. That is, under the assumption of 
mandatory tax consolidation and a tax group  definition corresponding to economic reality. This matter is not further discussed at this place. 
45 Article 15 Dutch CITA. See footnotes 5, 25 and 42. 
46 In addition, we assume that the applied CIT concept of income and the attribution of the CIT base to taxable years operate tax-neutrally. 
For instance, we ignore additional distortions that occur due to differentiations between the CIT base and the commercial profits. We also 
ignore the financing discrimination issues that are apparent in the Dutch CIT system. Moreover, we consider the allocation of the taxable 
base to taxing jurisdictions to operate tax-neutrally as well. We disregard the distortive effects as caused by the application of the at arm’s 
length principle. Finally, we consider the tax consolidation to completely match the economic entity. For the purpose of our analysis, we 
maintain the restricted scope of application of the Dutch tax consolidation regime in a cross-border environment in our assumptions (i.e., 
the non-allowance of a cross-border fiscal unity). 
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Comm. profit Group X bv 20 150 170 
Taxable profit  
(tax consolidation) 
20 150 170 
CIT payable (25%) 5 37.50 42.50 
Attribution CIT Utrecht 25 12.50 37.50 
Attribution CIT R’dam  <20> 25 5 
 
In year 1, the economic entity X Group generates a combined commercial profit of € 20. This 
commercial given is respected when the CIT payable is calculated. Regardless the chosen legal forms, X 
Group owes the Dutch tax authorities € 5 CIT on a taxable profit of € 20. In year 2, X Group produces a 
combined commercial profit of € 150. This too is respected when the CIT payable is calculated. Accordingly, 
regardless of the chosen legal form, X Group owes the Dutch tax authorities € 37.50 CIT on a taxable profit of € 
150 in year 2. Overall, X Group pays € 5 + € 37.50 = € 42.50 CIT on an overall profit of € 170. The attribution of 
CIT to the Utrecht branch respectively equals € 25 in year 1 and € 12.50 in year 2, i.e., an on balance amount 
of € 37.50 tax. This corresponds with the Utrecht commercial profits of € 100 and € 50 respectively in years 1 
and 2. The functional attribution of CIT to the Rotterdam branch respectively equals <€ 20> in year 1 and € 25 
in year 2, i.e., an on balance amount of € 5 tax. This corresponds with the Rotterdam commercial profits of 
<€ 80> and € 100 respectively in years 1 and 2.  
Under the aforementioned assumptions, in the domestic scenario the CIT liability is determined in a 
neutral and balanced manner. The CIT reality and the business economics reality match. Economic equivalent 
scenarios are tax treated in the same way. The choice of legal form does not alter the tax treatment. 
Please note that the neutral CIT treatment regardless of the legal structuring of X Group’s business 
affairs has been caused solely by the application of the tax consolidation regime. The economic entity, the 
group, is essentially considered to be the taxable unit, thereby favoring business economics reality over the 
legal structuring. One may recognize some form of unitary taxation in this respect.47 Please note that without 
the presence of the tax consolidation regime, Group X in ‘Case Indirect’ would be forced to wind up Rotterdam 
B.V. and cease its activities just to be able to horizontally set-off the year 1 Rotterdam loss of <€ 80> against 
the year 1 Utrecht profit of € 100. Forcing corporate taxpayers to liquidate subsidiaries and to cease trading to 
solely enable a tax loss set-off in line with economic reality seems undesirable to us. The Dutch tax legislator 
shows evidence of sharing this opinion given the presence of the tax consolidation regime in the Dutch CIT 
system today.  
 
Scenario 2: ‘Y Group’ – Cross-border scenario – ‘Tested Case’ 
A Dutch resident taxpayer, Y Group B.V., operates two businesses, two branches of activities. One branch is 
situated in Utrecht, the other is situated in Antwerp, Belgium.  
 
• In the first alternative, ‘Case Direct’, Y Group conducts its business operations directly; 
• In the second alternative, ‘Case Indirect’, Y Group operates its Utrecht and Antwerp branches via 
controlled subsidiaries, Utrecht* B.V. and Antwerp BVBA. Upon request, Y Group B.V. and Utrecht* 
B.V. have been tax consolidated under the application of the Dutch tax consolidation regime. Y Group 
B.V. is considered to be the substantive corporate taxpayer conducting the Utrecht branch of business 
activities directly for CIT calculation purposes. Antwerp BVBA has not been tax consolidated. Under 
current Dutch CIT legislation, the tax consolidation of foreign subsidiaries is not possible. The Dutch tax 
legislator follows legal reality to the extent that corporate taxpayers conduct their indirect business 
activities in a cross-border environment;48 
• The business profits are identical in both alternative cases; 
• The CIT rate is assumed to equal a linear 25%; 
• We consider both the effects under the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ method and the 
now abolished ‘tax exemption with progression method’49 
 
In year 1, the commercial profits generated by the Utrecht branch equals € 100. In that year, the Antwerp 
branch produces a profit of <€ 80> (i.e., a loss). In year 2, the Utrecht branch’s profit equals € 50. In that year, 
                                                 
47 See Maarten F. de Wilde, A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups In the Emerging Global Market, 39 Intertax 62 (2011), at 
62-84. 
48 As said, foreign subsidiaries are ineligible to be tax consolidated. Legal reality applies unreservedly. Form is elevated over substance. Up 
until today, the Court of Justice has approved this restrictive CIT treatment of groups of companies operating a multinational business 
under EU law in X Holding, supra note 19. This obviously distorts the choice of organizational form to the extent corporate groups operate 
their businesses in an intra-EU cross-border environment. See for some comments text accompanying footnote 42.  
49 We assume the ‘contributory profit’ of the foreign PE to match the ‘PE’s profit’ for which juridical DTR is available. We accordingly 
assume that both taxing jurisdictions employ the euro currency. Moreover, we consider intra-firm dealings and intra-firm transfers of assets  
to be absent. 
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the Antwerp branch produces a profit of € 100. Accordingly, the overall business profits realized in year 1 and 
year 2 equal € 170. The CIT effects are as follows.  
 
Fig. 3. ‘Case Direct’ (nominal amounts) 
 Year 1 year 2 Cumulative Yrs. 1-2 
Comm. profit Utrecht 100 50 150 
Comm. profit Antwerp <80> 100 20 
Comm. profit Group Y  20 150 170 
Worldwide taxable profit 
Group Y bv for Dutch CIT 
purposes  
20 150 170 
CIT payable (25%) – 
Application DTR under 
‘tax exemption with 
progression’ method 
(abolished) 
550 32.5051 37.50 
CIT payable (25%) – 
Application DTR under 
‘base exemption’ method  
(currently in place) 
2552 12.5053 37.50 
Attribution CIT Utrecht 25 12.50 37.50 
Attribution CIT Antwerp 
(DTR) 
<20> 25 5 
 
Fig. 4. ‘Case Indirect’ (nominal amounts) 
 Year 1 Year 2 Cumulative Yrs. 1-2 
Comm. profit Utrecht bv 100 50 150 
Comm. profit Antwerp 
bvba 
<80> 100 20 
Comm. profit Group Y 20 150 170 
Worldwide taxable profit 
Group Y bv for Dutch CIT 
purposes (tax cons.) 
100 50 150 
CIT payable (25%) 25 12.50 37.50 
Attribution CIT Utrecht bv 25 12.50 37.50 
Attribution CIT Antwerp 
bvba 
<20> 25 5 
 
In year 1, the economic entity Y Group generates a combined commercial profit of € 20. The Utrecht 
branch generates a profit of € 100. The Antwerp branch produces a profit of <€ 80> (i.e., a loss). Under the 
currently applicable CIT system, this commercial given is not respected when the CIT payable is calculated. 
Regardless of the chosen legal forms, Y Group owes the Dutch tax authorities € 25 CIT payable on a taxable 
profit of € 100. Consequently, in year 1, Y Group is actually required to pay more tax than the commercial 
profits it has produced. If we compare the case of Y Group with that of X Group, regardless of the chosen legal 
form, Y Group is required to pay a quintupled nominal amount of CIT payable. The Dutch CIT system has the 
effect that resident taxpayers operating their business in a cross-border environment, contrary to their 
counterparts that decided to remain at home, are faced with a shift of their tax loss set-off entitlements to an 
uncertain future. Y Group is forced to finance, upfront, its (conditional) tax loss compensation claim nominally 
worth € 20 regarding its Flemish loss of € 80 in year 1. Regardless of the legal structure of the cross-border 
business affairs, the actual losses suffered today can merely be deducted or otherwise set-off against profits 
produced tomorrow. Contrary to the solid horizontal loss set-off claim granted to X Group in year 1, Y Group 
has to settle for a mere conditional vertical loss compensation claim as Y Group first needs to generate positive 
income items in future tax years before the Dutch CITA enables Y group to make use of the loss set-off. The 
prospect of a future profit is uncertain. This holds true especially under the current tendencies of the 
(inter)national markets. Should Y Group be unable to generate positive income in future years, the conditional 
receivable on the Dutch tax authorities goes south. An on balance loss at the end of the day does not entail a 
                                                 
50 The taxable base equals 100 – 80 = 20. 5 CIT is accordingly due (0.25 * 20). The Flemish loss of 80 needs to be recaptured to the extent 
the taxpayers manage to derive a profit in a subsequent tax year. 
51 The taxable base equals 150. The CIT calculated on this amount equals 37.50 (0.25 * 150). Under the application of the ‘mechanism for 
recapture of foreign losses’, the DTR granted equals 5. (100 – 80) / 150 * 37.50 = 5). The CIT payable equals 32.50 (37.50 – 5 = 32.50). 
52 The taxable base equals (100 – 80) + 80 = 100. The CIT due equals 25 (0.25 * 100). 
53 The taxable base equals (50 + 100) – 100 = 50. The CIT due equals 12.50 (0.25 * 50). 
 11 
tax refund. This holds true regardless of the application of the ‘liquidation loss set-off regime’ or the ‘cessation 
regime’. Notably, the sole alternative available to Y Group is to close down the Antwerp branch in the first year. 
That would enable Y group to apply the ‘liquidation loss set-off regime’ or the ‘cessation regime’ in year 1 and 
to horizontally deduct the Antwerp loss of € 80 against the € 100 Utrecht profit. In our view, this is equally 
undesirable as the equivalent scenario regarding X Group in the ‘Indirect Case’ in the absence of the tax 
consolidation. These domestic CIT effects render the export of production factors undeniably less attractive. It 
restricts corporate groups in their decision to set up a branch of business activities in a cross-border intra-EU 
context. Accordingly, the Dutch tax treatment does not promote export neutrality within the internal market.54  
In year 2, Y Group generates a combined commercial profit of € 150. The Utrecht branch generates a 
profit of € 50. The Antwerp branch generates a profit of € 100. Regardless of the chosen legal forms, Y Group 
owes the Dutch tax authorities € 12.50 CIT on a taxable profit of € 50. Overall, Y Group pays € 25 + € 12.50 = € 
37.50 Dutch CIT on an overall Utrecht profit of € 150. The Netherlands steps down and provides DTR, which in 
terms of nominal amounts of tax is worth € 20 – € 25 = <€ 5>. This is due to the <€ 80> + € 100 = € 20 profit 
that can be attributed55 to the Antwerp branch. The nominal amount of € 20 CIT that Y Group has financed 
upfront yesterday, i.e., in year 1, is received back today, i.e., in year 2.56 Y Group has been lucky. It managed 
to produce a profit in year 2. Y Group can offset its receivable on the Dutch tax authorities. Had Y Group not 
managed to derive a profit from its Antwerp branch, Y Group would be unable to ‘cash its cheque with the 
Dutch tax authorities’. In addition, it should be mentioned that the Dutch tax authorities indeed enable Y Group 
to set-off the year 1 loss against the year 2 profits. However, no interest is remunerated during this period. 
Upon shifting the loss set-off entitlement to the future, the Dutch tax legislator did not make the conditional 
receivable interest-bearing. In comparison with X Group, accordingly, Y Group remains worse off as it is still 
confronted with a cash flow disadvantage. That is regardless of the substantive vertical loss set-off. In our 
example, the Dutch tax authorities take away € 20 during a 1-year period without compensating Y Group for 
this. Please keep in mind that the Dutch tax authorities do not confront X Group with this restrictive CIT 
treatment as the Dutch CITA enables X Group to horizontally set-off the Rotterdam loss against the Utrecht 
profit in year 1. And note that the cash flow disadvantage imposed on Y Group is the best case scenario.57 Viz., 
the longer it takes for Y Group to produce a profit abroad, the less value its conditional vertical loss 
compensation entitlement will have (due to the time value of money). Hence, even if Y Group manages to 
vertically offset the year 1 Antwerp loss against a year 2 profit, the Dutch CIT treatment restricts corporate 
taxpayers in their decision to set up a branch of business activities in a cross-border intra-EU context. Due to 
the raised (timing) disadvantages the Dutch CIT system does not promote export neutrality or economic 
                                                 
54 Cf. Bender, supra note 2. 
55 That is, according to accepted profit-allocation methodology. 
56 Please note that we do not enter into our analysis potentially available vertical loss set-off possibilities in Belgium (e.g., loss-carry back). 
Indeed, no distortion would arise for the taxpayer if Belgium would unilaterally ‘fix’ the problem in the distortive Dutch CIT system on its 
behalf by providing a loss-carry back. This would be the case, yet only, to the extent that the Belgian carry back is granted at an amount 
identical to the Dutch effective average tax rate. Otherwise the disadvantage imposed by the Netherlands regime, at least to some extent, 
would remain to exist (which, in our view illustrates the perhaps somewhat hypothetical nature of such a coincidental unilateral fixing 
operation at the opposite side of the tax border), Yet, theoretically perhaps more important, we take the position that the properties of the 
scrutinized EU tax system should be tested on their individual merits, i.e., without looking at the tax effects across the tax border. This is for 
the following reasons. Indeed, it may be argued that the distorting Dutch CIT treatment could perhaps pass muster under primary EU law if 
one would consider the CIT effects abroad as well, i.e., in our case Belgium. It is true that EU jurisprudence provides examples of cases in 
which the Court of Justice made the (in)compatibility of an EU MS tax measure with the fundamental freedoms dependent on the tax 
effects in another EU MS (see e.g. De Groot, case C-385/00 – on the tax treatment of personal allowances – and Marks & Spencer II, case 
C-446/03 – on the tax treatment of cross-border losses). This said, yet, worth noting is that there are also examples available in which the 
court does not. Regarding cross-border losses, reference can be made in this respect to both ‘home state cases’, e.g., (implicitly) X 
Holding, supra note 19, and (also implicitly) C-414/06 (Lidl), as well as, since recently, a ‘host state case’, i.e., (explicitly) C‑18/11 (Philips 
Electronics). Regardless of the doctrinal confusion that may be triggered as a consequence of this, the matter has lead some scholars to 
observe that the Court of Justice applies an ‘always somewhere approach’, on the basis of which, e.g., the unilateral denial by an EU MS of 
a horizontal cross-border loss set-off otherwise available in a pure domestic scenario is eligible to be justified if some other country allows 
vertical loss set-off. Others, e.g., Advocate General Kokott in her opinions in Philips Electronics, and particularly C-123/11 (A Oy), 
conversely, argue that one should not look at whatever happens abroad. In our view, regardless of what the Court of Justice observes in 
this respect, it is – in the style of Walter Hellerstein – undesirable to construct a rule that, for its operation, depends on the present 
configuration of the tax laws of the other EU MSs. Such an approach would make the compatibility of EU MS tax laws dependent on the 
shifting complexities of the tax systems of 27 sovereign EU MSs. The (in)compatibility with EU law of the taxes imposed on an individual 
taxpayer would depend on the particular other EU MS in which it operates. Furthermore, it would encroach upon EU MSs sovereign 
entitlements to tax income: which hierarchically equal sovereign EU MS should step back in a particular case, the one last to adopt a 
particular tax rule? Indeed, ‘there is something unseemly about determining tax liabilities “on a first-come-first-tax basis”. Given the 
fundamental concerns underlying the fundamental freedoms, it would be perverse indeed to establish a rule rewarding beggar-thy-
neighbour EU MS tax policies with EU MS tax collections depending on who won the race to the taxpayer’s door.’ See for this exact same 
argument – in a conceptually similar but legally different context, i.e., on the constitutionality of U.S. state taxes – Walter Hellerstein, Is 
“Internal Consistency” Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 139. 1988-
1989 at p. 170. See further, Walter Hellerstein, Is “Internal Consistency Dead?: Reflections on an Evolving Commerce Clause Restraint on 
State Taxation ”, 61 Tax L. Rev. 1, 2007-2008. 
57 Ibid. and accompanying text. 
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efficiency. It merely enhances the artificial fragmentation of the internal market alongside the national (tax) 
borders of the EU MSs.58 
If we compare the CIT consequences under the current and former juridical DTR mechanism, a 
‘temporization difference’ can be determined. Under the application of the, now abolished, ‘tax exemption with 
progression method’, Y Group would be liable to pay an amount of € 5 Dutch CIT on the actual derived 
commercial profit of € 20 in year 1. That would equal the amount of CIT which X Group is required to pay in that 
year. Accordingly, the business economics reality would be respected for CIT calculation purposes. In year 2, Y 
Group would be liable to pay an amount of € 32.50 Dutch CIT. Overall, Y Group would pay € 5 + € 32.50 = € 
37.50 Dutch CIT on an overall Utrecht profit of € 100 + € 50 = € 150. As is the case with the currently applied 
DTR mechanism, overall, the Netherlands would step down and provide DTR, which in nominal amounts of tax 
is worth <€ 25> + € 20 = <€ 5>. This is due to the <€ 80> + € 100 = € 20 profit that can be attributed to the 
Antwerp branch. The key difference with the current DTR mechanism, the ‘base exemption’, is that the € 20 tax 
which Y Group would have offset yesterday under the ‘tax exemption with progression’, in year 1, regarding the 
Antwerp business loss of € 80, would be recaptured today, that is in year 2,. The taxpayer’s receivable on the 
Dutch tax authorities would be offset when the tax loss is suffered. Y Group would set-off the Antwerp loss of 
€ 80 against the Dutch profits of € 100 at the time the Flemish loss has actually been suffered. Just as is the 
case with the Rotterdam loss as suffered by X Group. The tax authorities would collect the tax when the profits 
have been made, i.e., in year 2 under the recapture mechanism. Accordingly, the CIT treatment of the 
economically equivalent domestic (X Group) and cross-border scenarios (Y Group) would be treated exactly 
the same for tax purposes. Both X Group and Y Group would be able to horizontally set-off their losses and 
profits in year 1. Contrary to the currently in place ‘base exemption’, the application of the ‘tax exemption with 
progression method’ would not require Y Group to finance its conditional loss compensation entitlements 
upfront. Consequently, the now abolished ‘tax exemption with progression’ operates neutrally.59 It leaves 
corporate groups unrestricted in their decision to take their business across intra-EU national tax borders or 
not. It promotes tax neutrality within the internal market.  
                                                 
58 Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, 
Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, Brussels, 19.12.2006, COM(2006) 824 final. See also the technical annexes to this 
document, Commission staff working document, Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, Tax Treatment of Losses in Cross-Border Situations, Technical Annexes, 
Brussels, 19.12.2006, SEC(2006) 1690. The Commission analyses the matters analytically in an identical manner. Notably, one refers to 
coordination in this respect to resolve the matter. In our view, the reference to required coordination efforts does not mean that the issue 
concerned should be considered a market distortion caused by disparate tax systems. The market distortions concerned are imposed by a 
single EU MS. Accordingly, the distortive effects analytically cannot be caused by mutual divergences in the international tax systems 
within the EU. The reason one needs to resort to a coordinated approach, may be explained by referring to Marks & Spencer II, supra note 
56 in which the Court of Justice approved these kinds of unilaterally imposed cash flow disadvantages. Conceptually, the market distortion 
at hand should be labeled an ‘obstacle’ rather than a disparity. In Marks & Spencer II, supra note 56, the Court of Justice nevertheless 
allowed EU MSs to uphold such an obstacle. To illustrate this position, we point at the CIT treatment in the Netherlands up to 1 January 
2012. Up to that date, the Netherlands unilaterally allowed the cross-border loss-offset. Today, this is no longer the case. Accordingly, the 
cash flow disadvantage is the sole effect of replacing the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption with progression method’ with the ‘base exemption for 
foreign business profits’ mechanism for juridical DTR purposes. The distortive effects have solely been caused by a change within the 
Dutch CIT treatment of foreign income. A unilateral legislative turn of events accordingly. Thus, the effects necessarily cannot be the 
consequence of the combined application of disparate tax systems within the EU only to be resolved by a coordination or harmonization 
measure. The distortion rests in a unilaterally imposed restriction which the Court of Justice approves for (in our view) indistinct reasons. 
59 Please note that, contrary to what the Court of Justice has considered, for instance, in X Holding, supra note 19, the tax exemption 
mechanism does not effectively allow for taking cross-border tax losses effectively into account in two jurisdictions (‘double dip’), i.e., as a 
horizontal loss in the running tax year in one country and as a vertical loss in a previous or future tax year in another. First, the ‘recapture 
mechanism’ would ensure that no DTR is granted in following tax years as long as the losses from earlier years have not been recaptured. 
Second, if a taxpayer would be so unfortunate not to manage to derive a profit in a future year, indeed the loss may be seen in two 
jurisdictions. But should that be considered problematical? We consider this not to be the case. The taxpayer at hand has derived a loss in 
a certain tax year which he has not been able to recoup at a later time. This implies that it had to cease trading. No money has been made 
to set-off the loss against. So why recapture it and pay tax upon the cessation of the business? We do not see why a loss set-off taken at 
some earlier times should be recaptured upon the cessation of business when profits in fact have never been realized. Third, indeed, it is 
true that the Dutch CIT system contained an arbitrage opportunity until 2012. It allowed taxpayers to effectively establish a deferral of the 
recapture (indefinitely in theory). This had to do with the differences in the CIT treatment of PEs and subsidiaries. As said, the tax 
exemption regime for PEs allowed current losses to be deducted, while the participation exemption regime for subsidiaries does not. This 
encouraged taxpayers to initially set up foreign operations through a PE and subsequently to issue them into a participation as soon as the 
business breaks even. This would render the recapture of PE losses under the tax exemption regime impossible. Initial losses would be 
deducted while subsequent repatriated business profits would be exempt from the CIT base. Government responded by adopting a claw-
back mechanism to counter this effect (Article 13c Dutch CITA, abolished as of 2012, transitional rules apply). Under Article 13c, the 
participation exemption is unavailable as long as the initially deducted PE losses have not been recaptured. Instant recapturing is required 
if the taxpayer in effect transfers its participation or underlying business to an affiliate. The recapture mechanism, however, is poorly 
designed. The recapture is only triggered upon a dividend distribution by the subsidiary. Accordingly, as long as the respective subsidiary 
stalls dividend payments, the recapture is effectively cancelled out. The matter could have been resolved, for instance, by adopting a fair 
market value (‘FMV’) tax accounting requirement in respect of the equity investment to the extent that the deducted losses have not yet 
been recaptured. It should be noted, though, that the faulty design of Article 13c has little to do with the tax exemption mechanism itself. It 
should be appreciated that the design issues in the now abolished Article 13c Dutch CITA should analytically be kept separated from 
observations on the operation of the tax exemption mechanism. The tax exemption should be analyzed on its own merits. 
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All in all, the corporate taxation of proceeds from cross-border business activities does not occur in a 
tax-neutral manner under the current DTR mechanism. Equivalent economic circumstances are treated 
dissimilarly for tax purposes. The CIT reality and the business economics reality do not match. Resident 
taxpayers doing business abroad are required to finance conditional loss compensation entitlements upfront. 
The CIT effects are the same, yet to the extent one considers the legal structuring of the resident taxpayers’ 
business affairs abroad. To that extent, the newly introduced DTR mechanism promotes the neutrality of legal 
form. However, if one compares the tax treatment of Dutch resident taxpayers conducting their businesses 
abroad to the tax treatment of Dutch resident taxpayers trading at home, the tax neutrality is absent. The DTR 
system discourages outbound investments. It restricts the export of production factors. The absence of export 
neutrality has been caused by the transition to a stricter territorial approach under the ‘base exemption for 
foreign business profits’. Territorial tax systems merely promote import neutrality.60 They do not promote export 
neutrality. 
The ‘temporization difference’ that occurs if one compares the tax effects under the ‘base exemption for 
foreign business profits’ method to the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption with progression method’ strikingly illustrates 
the decline. Under the application of the ‘tax exemption’ single taxation is recognized in an economically 
efficient manner, while, simultaneously, the territoriality principle is appreciated as well. An approach which 
allows for a deduction of cross-border losses when they are economically suffered in combination with a 
recapture mechanism that applies when the entrepreneur produces a foreign source profit acknowledges the 
taxpayer’s ability to pay. The export of production factors is left unrestricted. The Dutch-style ‘tax exemption 
with progression method’ therefore, from a unilateral perspective, promotes export neutrality. In addition, as the 
DTR mechanism provides for relief for foreign profits calculated according to Dutch standards, the actual tax 
burden imposed in the source state is left undisturbed. Viz., the DTR mechanism provides for a credit of 
domestic tax attributable to the foreign income. Accordingly, it promotes import neutrality as well. The newly 
introduced ‘base exemption’ also achieves single taxation under the appreciation of the territoriality principle. It 
also leaves local tax burdens unimpeded. The import of production factors is left unrestricted. The ‘base 
exemption accordingly promotes import neutrality. However, the ‘base exemption’ does not consider the 
taxpayer’s ability to pay as the aforementioned example clearly illustrates (€ 25 CIT payable on € 20 worldwide 
earnings in year 1). The application of the ‘base exemption’ unilaterally distorts the export of production factors 
and is, therefore, economically inefficient. 
 
6 The imbalance nevertheless seems legally unassailable 
 
Is the introduced imbalance legally assailable? In the assessments we have made so far, we believe that this is 
not the case. It has to be said, if one assesses the Dutch legislator’s craftsmanship in terms of the legislative 
techniques employed, the produced CIT legislation is an illustration of high-class tax law drafting.61 The 
legislature makes full use of the room made available under the double tax treaty law and European Union law 
as they stand today.62 
Under the current case law of the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the fundamental freedoms in 
the field of direct taxation, the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ essentially seems to be legally 
unassailable.63 The Court of Justice allows EU MSs to adopt tax systems deferring the cross-border set-off of 
business losses. The Court of Justice considers the absence of cross-border loss relief justified unless it 
concerns final intra-EU cross-border losses. In the Marks & Spencer II case, the Court of Justice ruled that 
                                                 
60 Notably, the promotion of capital import neutrality is one of the key Dutch tax policy objectives. The objective of promoting import 
neutrality lies at the heart of the Dutch ‘participation exemption’ and the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’. See Janssen et al, 
supra note 19. 
61 Cf. Bender, supra note 2. 
62 Worth noting is that restrictions that were already in place prior to the introduction of the ‘base exemption’ have not been taken away. 
This holds true, for instance, regarding triangular cases where non-resident taxpayers carry on a business in the Netherlands through a PE 
to which (passive) income items can be attributed which arise in a third state. The Netherlands does not consistently grant those non-
resident taxpayers DTR with respect to these third-country income items. This is not further discussed. See on this matter, Pijl 2012, supra 
note 2. 
63 This also holds true with respect to the Dutch CIT treatment of currency exchange results derived from foreign business activities. The 
adoption of the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ did not alter things in this respect. By enabling these currency exchange 
results to be taken into account, the Netherlands respects the Court of Justice’s ruling in the case Deutsche Shell in which the court held 
the German non-deduction of currency exchange losses that derived from foreign intra-EU business abroad to infringe upon the 
fundamental freedoms. See Court of Justice, case C-293/06 (Deutsche Shell). In addition, the Dutch tax legislator may also be considered 
to respect the Court of Justice’s case law regarding exit taxes. See Court of Justice, cases C-371/10 (National Grid), C-9/02 (Lasteyrie) and 
C-470/04 (N.). Hidden reserves realized upon the transfer of property from the Dutch head office to the PE abroad are taxed in tranches. 
The CIT does not become immediately due. Property transfers from the foreign PE to the Dutch head office entail a tax rebasing of the 
transferred property to its fair value leaving the hidden reserve to be taxed by the source jurisdiction.  
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such a final foreign source loss should be able to be deducted against domestic profits.64-65 Yet, the court 
considered the resulting (timing) disadvantage in such an instance not to constitute an infringement of the 
fundamental freedoms. A conditional loss set-off entitlement for a foreign source business loss suffered today 
apparently suffices in Marks & Spencer II. It should be said, though, that there is some legal uncertainty on this 
point. In the joined cases Metallgesellschaft-Hoechst, the Court of Justice arrived at an opposite conclusion as 
regards the EU law (in)compatibility of unilaterally imposed cash flow disadvantages. In these cases, the court 
considered a timing disadvantage imposed by the United Kingdom to be incompatible with the fundamental 
freedoms. 66 In addition, the Court of Justice took a similar position in the case Rewe Zentralfinanz, which dealt 
with a cash flow disadvantage imposed by Germany with respect to the corporate taxation of proceeds from 
cross-border indirect investments relative to the taxation of proceeds from domestic indirect investments.67 
Regrettably, in some cases unilaterally imposed (timing) disadvantages by EU MSs have been ruled 
compatible with the fundamental freedoms, while unilaterally imposed (timing) disadvantages have been ruled 
incompatible in others. Marks & Spencer II, on the one hand, and Metallgesellschaft-Hoechst and Rewe 
Zentralfinanz, on the other, mutually do not align analytically. We have some difficulties in appreciating these 
apparent inconsistencies in the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the fundamental freedoms.68 
The ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ essentially seems legally unassailable under current 
Dutch international tax law as well. Under Dutch constitutional law, double tax conventions (DTCs) have priority 
over domestic tax laws. Domestic tax legislation incompatible with the DTCs in the Dutch DTC network 
constitute a ‘treaty override’ and are considered void as a consequence thereof. In our assessment the 
question as to whether the ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ constitutes a treaty override should be 
answered in the negative. The ‘tax base reservation’ consistently included in the DTR provision in the DTCs 
allows the Netherlands to include foreign source income in the CIT base. It does not require the Netherlands to 
do so. The DTC texts consistently require the Netherlands to merely provide for DTR regarding income items 
that are included in the CIT base (the ‘tax base reservation’). Subsequent to the application of the ‘base 
exemption for foreign business profits’, it may be argued that the respective foreign business profits are 
effectively excluded from the CIT base. That would entail that the Netherlands is not required to also allow for a 
reduction of the CIT payable under the application of the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption’. Arguments for this 
position can be found in consistent case law of the Dutch Supreme Court. It appears that, as an effect of the tax 
reduction under the ‘tax exemption with progression method’, substantially the foreign income items for which 
DTR has been granted are considered no longer included in the taxable base.69 Regardless, this is 
systematically not the case since the DTR occurs subsequent to the determination of the ‘taxable subject’, 
‘taxable base’, ‘tax rate’ and ‘tax’ (i.e., the analytical build-up of the Dutch CIT system). Consequently, if the 
foreign income is ruled not to be included in the taxable base subsequent to the application of the tax reduction 
under the tax exemption, a fortiori, this should also be considered the case if the CIT ‘taxable base’ is being 
altered under the application of a fictitious correction mechanism, the ‘base exemption for foreign business 
profits’. 
 
7 Concluding remarks 
 
Could the Dutch tax legislator have adopted a fairer approach towards imposing CIT in a cross-border 
environment? In our view, it could have. The conceptually soundest approach would be to adopt cross-border 
tax consolidation while providing DTR under the Dutch-style tax exemption method.70 Today, politically, this is 
perhaps a step too far. The alternative would be to replace the participation exemption for economic DTR 
                                                 
64 See Marks & Spencer II, supra note 56. One may argue whether the DTR mechanism infringes upon EU law to the extent that the loss 
recognized under the ‘cessation regime’ does not match the ‘final loss’ under the ‘M&S exception’. A conclusion on this matter seems 
dependant on a further interpretation of the European Court of Justice’s case law, in the end by the court itself.  
65 However, it should be mentioned that the Court of Justice did not refer to its ‘M&S exception’ in its rulings in the cases X Holding, supra 
note 19 and Lidl, supra note 56). This, notably, has lead Advocate General Kokott to observe in her opinions in Philips Electronics, supra 
note 56, and particularly A Oy, supra note 56, that little room, if any, remains for the M&S exception to be acknowledged under current 
primary EU law. She opines that the non-recognition of cross-border loss set-off may be fully justifiable solely on territoriality arguments 
(‘balanced allocation of taxing powers’). Accordingly, Kokott seems to encourage the Court of Justice to allow EU MSs to adopt full-fledged 
territorial taxing systems. It is noted that such tax systems, indeed, promote production factor import neutrality. However, simultaneously, 
they severely hamper outbound investment. We fail to appreciate why the internal market should necessarily favor import neutrality over 
export neutrality. In the internal market, intra-EU investment is directed both inward bound and outward bound. Why should EU MSs be 
permitted under primary EU law to disregard jurisdiction neutrality when taxing the returns from the latter?  
66 See Court of Justice, cases C-397/98 and C-410/98 (Metallgesellschaft / Hoechst). 
67 See Rewe Zentralfinanz, supra note 37. 
68 See footnote 64-65, and accompanying texts. 
69 See for a comparison Dutch Supreme Court, 8 February 2002, BNB 2002/184 (Japanse royalty) and Dutch Supreme Court 11 May 2007, 
BNB 2007/230 (Diehoeksinterest 2). 
70 See for a comparison De Wilde, supra note 47. 
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purposes with a variant of the ‘tax exemption’, an ‘indirect tax exemption’.71 Accordingly, economic DTR would 
be provided by means of an indirect credit for the underlying tax according to Dutch standards regarding the 
grossed-up proceeds from a participation.72 Such a DTR mechanism would enable current cross-border loss 
set-off by means of a write-off in the equity investment. Single taxation would be achieved by adopting a 
recapture mechanism.73 Such an approach would render the ‘liquidation loss-set-off regime’ obsolete. That 
regime could therefore be abolished. An additional effect would be that the economic DTR would be provided 
on a net basis. Such a transition could perhaps also be considered politically as a step too far. Nevertheless, an 
interesting side-effect of introducing such a net economic DTR mechanism would be that the Dutch CIT system 
would no longer provide for interest deductions on debt issued to finance income from equity investments that 
is not effectively taxed due to the application of the participation exemption. Today, this mismatch between 
deductible expenses and exempt profits74 is considered a major policy issue in the Netherlands.75 As of 1 
January 2013, the deduction of excess interest on debts deemed to be related to the financing of participations 
is limited.76 Notably, the European Commission too considers double non-taxation due to the deduction of 
interest expenses on debt financed investments producing tax exempt earnings to be problematical. Recently, it 
released a document for public consultation purposes in which this matter, amongst others, is touched upon.77 
 We have arrived at our conclusions. The Dutch tax legislator has introduced a restrictive juridical DTR 
mechanism. The ‘base exemption for foreign business profits’ impedes the proper functioning of the internal 
market without internal frontiers. It makes outbound investments less attractive for Dutch resident corporate 
taxpayers as the cross-border loss set-off entitlements available under the Dutch-style ‘tax exemption 
mechanism’ have been shifted to an uncertain future. Today, resident taxpayers investing abroad are required 
to finance conditional future loss set-off claims upfront. Resident taxpayers investing at home are not 
confronted with this restrictive CIT treatment. Accordingly, the Dutch tax legislator impedes the spirit of the 
internal market by solely making the conduct of intra-EU cross-border business more burdensome. However, 
the legislature makes full use of the room as made available under the DTC law and European Union law as 
they stand today. This, nevertheless, does not render untrue our statement that the Dutch tax legislator, in this 
age of internationalization and globalization, entrenches itself behind domestic tax borders. We believe this to 
be a countermovement which has little to do with an equal and neutral CIT treatment of economically 
equivalent scenarios. The Dutch-style tax exemption mechanism – despite it being one in just a handful of 
neutral elements in the Dutch international tax system – regretfully has left the Dutch CIT arena. 
 
 
                                                 
71 Such an alternate approach requires some additional measures to guarantee tax neutrality. Regarding participations in subsidiaries one 
would need to adopt additional mechanisms to neutrally deal with currency exchange results and intra-group property transfers. In addition, 
the incentive to frustrate the recapture should be cancelled out as well. With this we aim at the possibility to defer the recapture by delaying 
the realization of the proceeds from the participation for CIT purposes (e.g. the deferral of dividend distributions). A recapture in line with 
business economics reality may be achieved by introducing a fair market value (‘FMV’) tax accounting requirement in respect of controlling 
equity investments in subsidiaries to the extent that the deducted losses have not yet been recaptured. There is some experience in the 
Netherlands with FMV tax accounting in respect of substantial equity investments in so-called ‘non-qualifying portfolio participations’ (Article 
13a Dutch CITA). See for the CIT treatment of such participations, Janssen et al., supra note 18. 
72 Such a mechanism would operate in a manner akin to the ‘participation credit’ regime, which is currently applied in respect of so-called 
‘non-qualifying portfolio participations’. Contrary to a credit calculated by reference to a fictitious underlying tax of 5%, the ‘indirect tax 
exemption’ would provide for a credit at the regular marginal CIT rate of 25%. For an outline of the ‘participation credit’ regime as it applies 
today, see Janssen et al., supra note 18. 
73 In addition, a carry-forward mechanism should be made available to ensure single taxation in the event that taxpayers derive domestic 
source losses while earning a profit from their indirect business operations abroad. See for some details and numerical examples of the 
carry-forward mechanism under the Dutch-style tax exemption mechanism, De Wilde, supra note 23.  
74 This mismatch is typically referred to as the ‘Bosal mismatch’, named after the Court of Justice’s ruling in case C-168/01 (Bosal) in which 
it held that a former tax provision that subjected a deduction of interest expenses related to the financing of a participation to the 
requirement that the participation derived from Dutch-source taxable profits was incompatible with EU law. The mismatch between 
deductible expenses and non-taxable profits does not arise under the other DTR mechanisms which provide for DTR on a net basis. For a 
further outline of the ‘Bosal mismatch issue’, see Janssen et al., supra note 18. 
75Note that the Dutch thin-capitalization rules of Article 10d Dutch CITA, which had been introduced to mitigate some of the negative effects 
of the Bosal mismatch, have been abolished for fiscal years starting on or after 1 January 2013. 
76 Article 13l Dutch CITA. Under the new rule, the taxpayer is deemed to have a debt relating to the financing of a participation to the extent 
that the average cost price of its participations exceeds its average equity. The interest on the participation debt is not deductible to the 
extend the amount of interest charged exceeds €750.000. Several exceptions apply.  
77 European Commission, Staff working paper, The internal market: factual examples of double non-taxation cases – Consultation 
document, Brussels TAXUD D1 D(2012). 
